Abstract
Bride price has remained a permanent martial culture by which some women are subordinated in Sub-Saharan Africa. The study intends to critically analyse the implications of bride price practices on marriage institutions in Cameroon, with a special case of Bali Nyonga of North West Region. Stratified, purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used to select the 18 respondents (9 males and 9 females). The Roland Empowerment Framework, Feminist and Human Rights Theories were used to explain the concept of bride price. Data were analysed using thematic content analysis. Although they attract prominent suitors, education and virginity do not determine the bride price. While some were exposed to levirate marriages, they are required to refund bride price upon divorce. Some men are expected to pay bride price for their dead women before being allowed to bury them. For some women who are seen as real and full women bride price brings wealth and women voices to be heard. There are few families who do not receive bride price at all.
Contribution: Bride price is the sole and most relevant pre-requisite for marriage in Bali Nyonga that encompasses any other marriage requirements; it must be completely paid and refundable upon divorce. Women should form a synergy to collectively fight against harmful traditional bride price practices such as levirate marriage, collaborate with men to take part in bridal negotiation, while more women should engage in research on bride price-related issues.
Keywords: bride price; culture; implication; negotiation; procedure; sexuality.
Introduction
This article presents a critical analysis on the implications of bride price practices on the traditional marriage institution in Cameroon from a gender perspective within the Bali Nyonga culture of the North West Region. The practice of bride price is a custom that is common in sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the world. It is one of the most crucial social mechanisms through which women are subordinated (Muthegheki, Crispus & Abraham 2012). However, the payment of bride price between families at the time of marriage existed in the history of some developed countries and is currently pervasive in many areas of the developing countries. The payment substantially affects the welfare of women, as well as the distribution of wealth across families and generations in Cameroon and many other African societies. It goes as far as affecting and influencing the way parents even perceive and view the birth of their daughters and sons in some areas (Anderson 2007:154). Bride price is the most relevant fulfilment of customary marriage in Cameroon. Baloyi (2014) calls it lobola from the South African context.
Marriage culture is a global issue although it might have been losing grounds in the Western World (Broekhuizen & Evans 2014). Nevertheless, contemporary wedding culture in the Western World is becoming modern and broadcast on television (TV), as was the case of Middleton and Prince Williams in 2011 on air. Broekhuizen and Evans (2014) further explained that gay rights and feminist movements have contributed to a backdrop of wedding in the Western World. However, Nkosi (2011:14) argues that one of the major differences that distinguish the Western marriage from African marriage practice is the payment of bride price.
In Cameroon bride price, practice is very complicated and, in most cases, outweighs the statutory laws. For instance, if a couple contracts marriage in court and wedded in church, without the payment of bride price, it does not render the union valid. This was evident in the case of Manga Ikome Vs Manga Ekemason, Suit No (ASWP/CC/76/185-unreported), where a husband was denied next-of-kin declaration of his deceased wife on grounds that bride price was not paid, despite the fact that he wedded his wife in church and married her legally. Bride price equally constitutes an important instrument for inheritance as well as determinants for lineage of the children born in the marriage because the wife is expected to prove in court via those children that they were officially married (Ashraf et al. 2015:6). However, a plethora of views have been advanced by a multitude of scholars regarding bride price practice, but the focus on the implications of bride price practices on traditional marriage institutions in Cameroon is still a cause for concern, justifying the rationale of this study as it examines the case of Bali Nyonga culture in North West Region of Cameroon, which is a replica of most of the cultures in Cameroon.
This research discusses the evolution of bride price, determinants of bride price, effects of bride price and some coping mechanisms to redress bride price-related issues in Bali Nyonga. The Roland Empowerment Framework, Radical Feminist and Natural Law Theories were used to examine the implications of bride price negotiation in Bali Nyonga. The next section examines the methodology of this study.
Methodology
This study is qualitative research that employs a descriptive-analytical research design to examine a critical observance of implications of bride price practices on traditional marriage institutions in the Bali Nyonga culture of Cameroon. The sample size of this study was 18, constituting 6 married men and women, 6 divorced men and women, 3 widowed women and 3 widowers of equal representation. A combination of stratified, purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used to collect data through the use of a structured interview guide. The study group was first stratified into married and divorced men/women, widowed and widower; participants were chosen based on their experience and longevity in marriage.
Snowballing was used in mostly divorced case as such categories could easily identify themselves with common plight. The data were analysed using a thematic content analysis, where responses were grouped into segments and thematically analysed in accordance with the objectives of the study. By so doing, subthemes were drawn from selected comments of respondents and given codes to avoid repetition. These responses were presented verbatim in quotes to elicit the in-depth interpretations and contributions of the respondents in their voices as seen in some of the quotations next. These subthemes were developed and expatiated under marriage negotiation/procedure, marriage requirements, influence of colonialism on female sexuality, influence of culture on female sexuality in Bali Nyonga, the determinants of bride price practices in the Bali Nyonga culture, effects and coping strategies to redress bride price-related issues in Bali Nyonga.
The Rolland Empowerment Framework was used to interrogate the unequal power relation that exists within traditional marriage institutions. This framework questions power relation at four levels: power within, power without, power over and power to. During marriage negotiation, the power within women is suppressed by the collective power in the hands of men who use culture to sideline women. This is a socially constructed role and decision of men who have collectively own power to manipulate bride price payment, so that it remains within their control, whereas women who never took part in the negotiation and payment are bound to refund bride price upon divorce and sometimes even forced into levirate marriage. This is a clear indication that one sex (men) has power over another (women) that is exercised within marriage institutions. According to culture the females of Bali Nyonga are not allowed to participate in bride price negotiations since they are perceived as properties of their husbands. They are represented by their husbands, rendering the Rolland Empowerment Framework suitable to integrate this study.
Discussion of findings from Bali Nyonga indigenes on how early marriage was conducted under procedure
Study indicates that marriage requirements in Bali Nyonga prior to European colonisation were mostly in the form of items such as palm wine, hoe, soap and salt in any quantity. What was used as money was chang [iron bangles] ranging from 7 to 10. In addition to that, the man was required to build a house for the in-laws called nda nchi and to work on their farm called nfaac chi. With the introduction of money by the colonialists, 7 to 10 pounds replaced 7 to 10 chang, and after independence, about US $113 to US $161 was paid as bride price. The current findings reveal that many people pay huge amount of money and items in Bali Nyonga (US $242 to $300) and more, 6 to 10 bags of salt and 6 to 10 tins of oil, cartons of soap, a special whisky, cash and material gifts to uncles, aunts and grandparents:
‘… money was not used before the coming of the white man. About 7 to 10 chang [iron rod in form of bangles] was enough for the payment of bride price, with just the immediate family. On the first visit, a calabash of palm wine was brought. No beer, no whisky …’ (Luma, 57, martital status unknown, male)
Insertion of pseudonyms
Marriage negotiation and procedure
There is an agreement by some African scholars that the bride price agreement has been the traditional way to solidify African marriage (Baloyi 2010a; Chigwedere 1982; Dlamini 1991; Mbiti 1991; Nhlapo 1991).
The findings of the study revealed that the identification of brides in Bali Nyonga was mainly through arrangement by parents or betrothal. Seventy per cent of the participants interviewed revealed that in the past, marriage was mostly arranged by the parents of the bride and the groom without the knowledge of the bride who was only informed on the day of the marriage.
Although there have been great changes in the marriage negotiations and procedures in Bali Nyonga, in the past it began with the identification of the bride, either through close relations, friends or parents, followed by investigations on the bride’s background, unlike today that girls choose their brides and vice versa for the groom. To confirm findings, one participant explained that:
‘… on the day of the marriage in Bali Nyonga, the bride was accompanied by a bridal trail to her husband’s house. This procedure took place for five days, and on the fifth day, the bride spends the night in the husband’s house …’ (Lena, 69, widowed, female)
Similarly, Mawere and Mawere (2010:226) opine that in South Africa, the suitor passed through respected neighbours or an elderly person to accompany him for a preliminary introduction, but today, they move with a car straight to the bride’s family. Nzoiwu (2012:4) also asserts that a bride could be found during ‘moonlight plays’ or at ‘market days’. When the bride was chosen, her parents had to consult an elder of the family who investigated the groom. In effect, women could be projected here as passive participants in the domain of marriage procedures because most of the activities carried out are instructed by men and mostly an extension of their triple roles that encompass reproductive, productive and community roles, evident in activities such as cooking, decorating, entertaining and just to mention these few. However, the marriage process has evolved with women having a degree of liberty to choose their husbands, as compared to arranged marriages or betrothal of the past.
As concerns the dressing of the bride in the Bali Nyonga culture, over the years, a bride was dressed in a special cloth called wondoh [half skirt], rubbed with cam wood and palm oil, accompanied by a host of bride’s mates [nfacdam], together with Tangwi [aunts]. But today, the bride and the groom are well dressed in very expensive traditional regalia. Still according to findings, the bride was well fed daily, preparing her to join the husband on the fifth day. It should be observed that the size or gene does not matter as this is applicable to both fat and slim girls. In the same light, Nzoiwu (2012:4) opines that in Inchinda tradition of Nigeria, a bride was usually rubbed with cam wood and palm oil and then put in a room call ‘fattening room’ and fed with nourishing food for days. In the Bangwa tradition of Cameroon as well, the bride was put inside a walled-off apartment in her mother’s house called ‘fattening room’, rubbed with camwood and fed with balanced diets to grow fat and look beautiful for her husband (Brain 1967:29). Today in Bali Nyonga, boys and girls fall in love and only inform their parents later, while some even cohabit and make children before the girl brings the man to the family, which is often accepted unlike in the past, suggesting that girls have the right to choose whom to marry. Mawere and Mawere (2010:226) also corroborate the above assertion that the girl in question is called up to identify the man and give her consent after which a day is agreed for the negotiation proper. Barend (1975:233) further explains that the bride and groom either fall in love or someone makes a match through family connections.
Marriage requirements
Marriage requirements in Bali Nyonga prior to European colonisation were mostly in the form of items such as palm wine, hoe, soap and salt in any quantity. In addition to that, the man was required to build a house for the in-laws called nda nhi and to work on their farm called nfaac nchi. With the introduction of money by the colonialists, 7 to 10 pounds replaced 7 to 10 chang, and after independence, about US $113 to $161 was paid as bride price. The current findings reveal that many people pay huge amount of money and items in Bali Nyonga (US $242 to $300) and more, 6 to 10 bags of salt and 6 to 10 tins of oil, cartons of soap, a special whisky, cash and material gifts to uncles, aunts and grandparents.
In the Hmong marriage custom in Minnesota USA, tobacco was given as a token of appreciation, while silver bars were used as bride price. But today, US currency (dollar) is used in place of bars and other items (Leepalao 2013:3). Asnell (2001:4–5) confirms that during the pre-colonial period in Lesotho and Zimbabwe, lobola [bride price] was in the form of items such as hoe, blanket, basket of grains and animals. The number of cattle was not fixed; thus, the poor could give three or four, while the rich could give up to 40. The junior men could work on the farm of their in-laws to make up the bride wealth of their wives.
Although the girl’s consent was never sought before any marriage negotiations, women are still left out in marriage negotiations today as no woman has ever negotiated her bride price in the history of Bali Nyonga and might not possibly do so soon. This is contrary to the ‘Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (African Union 2003) (Maputo Protocol) and Section 52(2) of the Cameroon Civil Status Registration Ordinance of 1981 that require the consent of the girl (Government of Cameroon 1981a).
Influence of colonialism on female sexuality
As concerns the influence of colonialism, one of the male married elites of Bali Nyonga named Luma attested that:
‘… the European colonisers introduced church weddings and court marriages, causing men to abandon their wives and stick to one woman, which brought commotion to Bali Nyonga back then …’ (Luma, 57, martital status unknown, male)
However, a cross-section of the indigenes confirmed that Christianity was a positive phenomenon that transformed mindsets and humanity (interview with the Bali Nyonga indigenes, 21 April 2023). In line with this, Kameri-Mbote (2002:7) opines that colonialist introduced Christian marriage in Kenya, alongside church wedding, forcing the men to chase other women and marry one wife. A divorced female native of Bali Nyonga also argued that the introduction of money made it difficult to equate the number of chang to exact amount of money.
In the same light, Asnell (2001) notes that the introduction of European currency, ploughs and carts for marriage exchange influenced most natives who preferred that to their goat, cattle, hoe, rendering bride price more expensive. Another married woman [legunka] articulated further that the concept of bride price was misinterpreted by foreigners who saw it as commercialisation of human beings, which conflicted with African mentality generally, and Bali Nyonga in particular. However, Walker (1926:5) argues that the French Administration in Cameroon condemned marriage practices in the rural areas during the colonial era and termed it ‘commerce’ and ‘slavery’. In the same light, early colonialists associated lebola in Zimbabwe to the sale of daughters in exchange for cattle, while the protestant missionaries in Lesotho viewed it as transaction, degrading women as chattels (Asnell 2001:4). Babaee and Babaee (2012:151) remark that the pace that the colonisers set for male dominance is so internalised and served as a path difficult to challenge, passed on generations. However, the interference of the Europeans might have brought new development in marriage but had never changed the mentality of the Bali people and their culture, as bride price still remains the most paramount pre-requisite for marriage fulfilment. From the aforesaid, it is obvious that colonialism had a positive impact on bride price in Bali Nyonga because they introduced money that replaced the chang. Although, initially, it was difficult to determine the exact number of chang to equate with money, overtime it was mastered by the indigenes. However, the notion of women as chattels came from the colonialists who saw the payment of bride price as a form of selling human beings, which they referred to as slavery that had long been abolished in 1840. Nevertheless, their thoughts never translated into convincing the people of Bali Nyonga because bride price remains a sole pre-requisite for traditional marriage in this area and the male, the sole negotiator and determinant of the amount to be paid.
Influence of culture on female sexuality
The Bali Nyonga culture has an influence on female sexuality in marriage, especially to women whose bride price has been paid. More than half of the participants (80%) confirmed that the man has the right to have sex with the wife anytime he wants and that she has no right to negotiate sex because it is just part of a marital duty. According to Chabata (2012:13), some married women find it difficult and hard to even negotiate safe sex because their husbands simply ask, ‘Did the cattle we paid go with condoms on?’ In the same vein, Rotimi in Chweshe (2016) elucidates that most African cultures believe that once bride price is paid on the woman, she automatically becomes the property of the husband. Therefore, denying sex to the man who has paid bride price is culturally unacceptable because it is seen as part of the marriage contract (Leclerc-Madlala 2000, cited in Chweshe 2016). Leclerc_Madlala further observes that the institution of bride price is highly sexualised and transfer of sexual rights. However, a few participants in this study argued that sex is a mutual exercise that demands the consent of both parties. This group of participants explained that forcing a woman to have sex is an infringement on her right to sexuality. Chabata (2016) explains that there is a law in Zimbabwe that changes patriarchal norms progressively and criminalises marital rape. According to this law, a married woman has legal rights to refuse sex to her husband when she has a reason. While a majority reported that once a woman is duly married to a man, she owes him a duty to have sex anytime; a minority rather think that sex is a pleasurable exercise and should be performed with the consent of the man and the woman. However, this study shows to a greater extent that a woman does not own her sexuality, especially a woman whose bride price has been paid. This is just a way of exercising male supremacy over women (power over) and having decision-making authority over the woman’s body (power to).
The determinants of bride price practices in the Bali Nyonga culture
Education as a determinant of bride price in the Bali Nyonga culture
Education was not a determinant of bride price in Bali Nyonga as it was revealed by a 70-year-old married custodian of Bali Nyonga (Lebga) that educating a girl child is her civic right and not necessarily for bride price. Men and women of Bali Nyonga complained that when bride price is too high, the man can use it against their girl child, and that their children are not properties to be sold. High and excessive bride price is punishable by Cameroonian law although many villagers might be ignorant. This is evident in Section 357 (4) of Cameroon Penal Code, which stipulates that whosoever demands the whole or any part of excessive bride price of the marriage of a girl, divorced or widowed woman shall be punished with of an imprisonment of one to 5 years and a fine of $0.81 to $805.01 or both. An argument crops up that highly educated girls have the privilege to choose their husbands and oftentimes are exposed to financially viable suitors who in turn bring high bride price. Wegh (2003) alleges that parents spend much money in educating their girl children and often want to recover, suggesting that more education means more years of parental care and heavier expenditures on schooling. Some of the respondents reported that some men pay very high bride price based on love, not necessarily education. Some female participants also complained that they have lost responsible suitors in their lives because they were not educated. However, these participants (40%) attested to the fact that it is not acceptable in Bali Nyonga to demand high bride price because of a girl’s education, although some people might be practicing that within their local community. Such indigenes testified that they have seen wealthy men who got married to non-educated girls, and university graduates got married to poor men, indicating that love conquers all and that if a man loves his wife, he can pay higher based on the love, not education. Other participants (60%) held that education is a prominent civic right of all citizens as spelled out in Goal 4 of the Sustainable Development Goal (2015), which seeks to ensure inclusive and quality education to promote lifelong learning opportunities for all by 2030.
Virginity as a determinant of bride price
Virginity has no influence in determining bride price in the Bali Nyonga culture yet could influence the husband to love and respect the wife. One of the main issues raised by the participants’ concerns regarding traditional marriage in the past was the verification of virginity. All the participants (100%) of equal representation explained that usually before the marriage procedure was completed, the groom had to ensure that the girl was a virgin. However, a participant said that virginity was valued in the olden days where the mothers of the bride earned a token of appreciation for keeping the girl’s virginity (a tin of palm oil precisely):
‘The first night spent by the girl in the man’s house was inspected, or she was kept till menstruation if suspected, to confirm her virginity. In case she was a virgin, her mother would be given a special gift. If she comes with pregnancy, she will pass through the fence, and her mother will lose that special gift.’ (Lebaga, 50, married, male)
Some girls cohabited with men, while some even got married and bore children before introducing to their parents, and others fall in love before showing up. This made the girls to lose their virginity before marriage. Also in South Africa, the parents of a virgin girl earn an extra cow because it is believed that the man is marrying a ‘pure girl’, and that girls in this society who lose their virginity were seen as ‘outcast’ or ‘damaged goods’, causing parents to ‘police’ their girls in order to gain that cow and dignity (Chweshe 2016). Yet, the female virginity is tested, which either raises the bride price or drops it, while the male’s result when tested does not affect the marriage (Chweshe 2016; Mawere & Mawere 2010).
Occupational background as determinant of bride price
Occupational background turns to have much influence on the culture of bride price in Bali Nyonga because it is assumed that the girl takes the fortunes to the man’s house. However, others gave contrary view, pointing out that love and not occupational background is the basis, and that a conscious girl child, whether working or not, has the responsibility to take care of her parents. Kameri-Mbote (2002:4) contends that a woman who only sits and does nothing is considered family property, whereas a woman who is employed and earns a good salary is respected by the family because she brings wealth. Arnfred (2004:23–24) argues that colonialism brings the notion of economically working class and strong sophisticated women in Tanzania who viewed marriage as an option, rather than a choice preferred to navigate among several men in order to avoid risk of subjugation from particular men. A cross-section of the participants equally submitted that it is the economic right of a girl child to work, not necessarily for bride price, but for a better life pursuant to Article 7(2) of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (United Nations General Assembly 1966), which spells out the equal right to work and right to remuneration irrespective of race, age, sex, status, class or any language barrier.
Effects of bride price practices on men and women
Bride price has both negative and positive effects on the men and women of Bali Nyonga. Women have been objectified, gone through levirate marriage while both men and women undergo financial difficulties from bride price-related issues. In some cases, bride price has served as a source of blessings to some men, project women’s voices and strengthens matrilineal lineage between families.
Objectification of women from the payment of bride price
Findings revealed that women are objectified from the payment of bride price in Bali Nyonga as they are termed property by their husbands. A total of 80% of men believed that once the bride price of a woman is paid, they have bought the woman and should treat her as one of their properties. Similarly, Asnell (2001) asserts that a woman is an object that creates and harmonise relationships between families. According to Avenger, Yandev and Arumun (2013), men tend to think that women become their goods and services, as well as personal property to be owned, maltreated and dumped when they have achieved their purpose. To reiterate, one participant said:
‘… I am not yet a full property of my husband because he has not completed my bride price. As soon as he does, I will be his everlasting property. That’s our culture; and I cannot change it …’ (Lebsia, 30, divorced, female)
In Senegal as well, high bride price transforms women into commodities and to their husband’s slaves (Plateau & Gaspart 2005). However, Roger (2004) claims that bride price is supposed to be a symbol of or a token of appreciation to a family of the bride, not meant to dehumanise women as property to be owned, sold and bought off in order to satisfy men’s selfish desires and ego.
Baloyi (2010b) in his article entitled ‘An African woman as a sexual object as a concern for gender equality’ argues on how women’s sexuality is male controlled as a result of the misinterpretation and misunderstanding of lobola (bride price). In this research, he indicated with examples as to how some women were beaten to forcefully have sex against their own will. He indicated that even when socialisation and the raising of a girl child took place, she would also be made prepared to be sexually obedient to men (Baloyi 2010b). Mbiti (1990:143) further argues that there were instances where an obedient woman was expected to offer sex as an act of hospitality. This kind of attitude gave birth to another article entitled ‘Sex as an expression of hospitality’ (Baloyi 2016). One of the arguments used to support this was that many African people misunderstood the tradition of bride price and went on to misinterpret and misrepresent it to make women objects of men as well as objects of abuse. These analogies drawn from a multitude of scholars are indicative of unequal power relation evident in Rolland Empowerment Framework. The collective power of men in Bali Nyonga have suppressed the power within women to stand out and has caused the women to regard themselves as their husband’s property.
However, 20% men of Bali Nyonga explained on the contrary that women are human beings like men who are equally supposed to own property, not to be looked upon as property, and that only uneducated men feel that a woman is property. A 70-year-old married man also explained that all human beings are equal and the property of each home is acquired by both parties – a man can never work for it alone.
Ngassa (1999) clearly states that any custom that says a woman or any human being is a property, who cannot inherit her deceased husband’s estates is not only repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience but is also contrary to written law as per Section 27(1) of the Southern Cameroon High Court Law of 1955 (Government of the United Kingdom 1955). A learned judge from Cameroon asked a woman in the case of Achu Vs Achu in the Bamenda Court of Appeal if one property could inherit another property, referring to her as a property. Women are addressed as chattels or property at home by their husbands and even in open courts by judges (Kingah & Kingah 2010:93). These scholars emphasise that the wrong notion of women as chattels stems from the payment of bride price. Insinuating the notion that a woman should not own property is rather contrary to Art 17(1) of the Married Women Property Act of 1882, which demands that a woman has the right to own and dispose of her property without the consent of any trustee or third party.
Exposure of women to levirate marriage
The practice of levirate marriage is not only practiced in Africa, Cameroon inclusive but is biblical because this practice was also a requirement under the Law of Moses in the Old Testament. It was a common practice in ancient Israel where a brother took his deceased brother’s wife to raise up children for him, particularly a son (Dt 25:5–10). Baloyi (2016) argued this point by saying:
It has been indicated that when the family agrees, suggests or even forces widows to marry a brother or relative of the deceased, the concept that is emphasised is that she needs to be taken care of since she remains married to a family even after the husband died because of the lobola paid for her. (p. 3)
This is one of the reasons used to force women into levirate marriage among some of the African people in South Africa. Accepting levirate marriage where the family will choose one of the brothers of the deceased was interpreted as another way of avoiding the return of the bride price as and when the marriage with the dead would be dissolved (Baloyi 2015:487; Ntozi 1997:127).
This Biblical practice of levirate marriage/wife inheritance was also captured in the Bali Nyonga culture. The findings revealed that while levirate marriage serves as a source of oppression for women, it serves as a blessing to those men who inherit the widows. The culture, however, seems to be losing grounds in most families today. According to this culture, a man can inherit the wife of his older brother, but the older brother cannot inherit that of his younger brother. Moreover, children born out of this relationship cannot inherit their father because they are considered illegitimate. Equally, a son cannot inherit the wife of his father, but if he succeeds his father, he can inherit the younger wife. A male respondent in this study confirmed that he inherited the wife of his late father. Courtesy of Buchi Emecheta’s (1976) The bride price in Nigeria by Bedana and Laishram (2014:69) reveals that after the death of Aku-nna’s father, she and her mother were inherited by her father’s elder brother Okwonkwo Odia. Okwonkwo allows Aku-nna to continue her education on grounds that she will fetch high bride price to enable him to gain the title of Obi [chief]. Kiye (2015:96) opines that in some parts of the Northwest Region of Cameroon, widows are inherited by their husbands’ brothers upon the demise of their husband, and that if the woman does not refund the bride price, the death of her husband does not terminate the marriage. This is in contrast to Art 77(1) of the Cameroon Civil Status Registration Ordinance of 1981, which states that marriage ends at the death of either spouse, while 77(2) declares that in the event of the death of the husband, his heir shall have no right over the widow (Government of Cameroon 1981b). This provision thus outlaws the practice of levirate marriage in Cameroon and ensures that instead of perceiving widows as property who cannot own property; they should rather be given the authority to exercise their proprietary rights of ownership.
A cross-section of the women who were victims of levirate marriage adhered to the fact that they were forced by their fathers, and that they did not have money to refund in case of rejection. The issue of levirate marriage was spelled out in the Cameroonian case of David Tchankokam Vs Keuo Magdaline (ACK/AL-/K, 33/97/92)1999 G.L.R.11) where the plaintiff David Tchankokam sought an order to force his levirate wife that he had long inherited with the husband’s estates to return home. The Kumba High Court dismissed his claim purporting that it was repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience pursuant to Section 27(1) of the Southern Cameroon High Court Law of 1955 (Government of the United Kingdom 1955). The court ruled against him on grounds that it was a forced marriage, contrary to Section 356(1) of the Cameroon Penal Code (Government of Cameroon 2016).
Exposure of men and women to financial difficulties, frustration and psychological traumas
When a woman divorces her husband, she must refund her bride price before she is free to remarry. In case she cohabits with another man, that man must refund her bride price to the former husband; else, she remains the wife of the former husband. In case the husband of a woman dies when she is still very young, she might be proposed to marry the brother of her husband. If she chooses to leave, she has to refund the bride price to the husband’s family. Men who are also married to divorced women or widows are obliged to refund bride price to the former husband; else, the children made from such a relationship go back to the former husband. In Cameroon, Kiye (2015) opines that it is only upon full payment of bride price that there becomes a marriage bond and equally upon full return of bride price that the marriage is annulled.
Although all the respondents attested that bride price must be refundable, the burden lies mostly on women who often return alone. This is because parents upon receiving bride price make it clear that as they receive the money, they will not refund it. Muthegheki et al. (2012) argue that the woman loses more because she usually refunds the bride price solely upon divorce irrespective of the elders who stood at the negotiation table to share the money. Previous literature in Kenya also suggests that some widows might want to remarry but cannot afford to repay the bride wealth because it is difficult to raise the money (Onyango 2016). One participant testified that she prostituted just to raise money to refund her bride price and attested. A 35-year-old divorced woman testified that she prostituted just to raise money to refund her bride price. She attested that she was chased by her husband, his father neither accepted her back nor repaid the huge amount that was taken as bride price. Mikhail (2002) corroborates that as a result, the woman becomes stranded and forced to remain and suffer or go to the world to objectify herself with other men in search of money to refund her bride price.
Bride price strengthens matrilineal lineage
Findings also reveal that incomplete bride price or total absence reinforces and strengthens matrilineal lineage in Bali Nyonga. If the bride price of a woman were not paid at all, the man could not claim to be the husband of that woman and would not also receive the bride price of his own daughter. The bride price of his daughter who marries first will go to compensate that of her mother. If the bride price is incomplete, the man receives only what he gave and the rest is taken to the maternal grandparents of the bride. This is an added knowledge to this research because no literature has been found on this aspect. This is the lone situation in Bali Nyonga where matriarchal characteristic is evident, giving credit to women and showing some degree of variation. Yet, men are still the beneficiaries because the bride price paid to the mother of the bride is still received by them. That is a clear aspect of gender discrimination and women subordination.
It has also been observed that if the bride price of a woman is not paid when she is alive, it must be paid when she is dead before the man claims her mortal remains or her children. In this case, the bride price is paid alongside all the marriage requirements in cash or in kind. If this is not done, the children will be claimed by the bride’s maternal family, or the children may not bear the man’s name. Men in Kenya who do not pay the bride price of their wives have no legal rights to their children and cannot bury them upon death, except they comply by carrying out all the marriage rites and payment of bride price (Onyango 2016). Kiye (2015:95) in Cameroon corroborates that child begotten by a wife during continuation of customary marriage with another man remains the issue of the original husband who paid her bride price irrespective of who is the biological father. This was evident in the Cameroonian case of Ngeh vs Ngome where a woman who had not refunded her bride price gave birth to a set of twins with another man, and the Kumba Native Court held that the children belong to the former husband. Although the customary marriage outweighs statutory marriage in the Bali Nyonga culture, it is regulated in Art70(1) of Cameroon Civil Status Registration Ordinance of 1981, which stipulates that payment or non-payment of bride price has nothing to do with marriages.
Bride price as a source of wealth for men and a projection of women’s voices (agency)
The study shows that bride price is a source of blessing to some men and women. Respondents explained that the bride price brings wealth to the family as money got from it can be used to send children to school and even carry repairs on parents’ houses. A male respondent testified that his in-law roofed his house. Bride price also settles debts for the families, which serve as source of wealth for the men to the detriment of women. Sisters are respected and have authorities over their brother’s wives because they are the ones who generate bride price through their own payment. This is because the cattle given for the female child can be used to marry a wife for the male child (Mester 2008:1).
Bride price also settles debts for the families, which serve as source of wealth for the men. This is to the interest of the men, and at the detriment of the bride who in case of divorce refunds solely. A female respondent confirmed that she was given to her father’s friend to compensate his father’s coffee debt. Women are often bargained as market property and given in betrothal to regulate their parents’ debt (Kingah & Kingah 2010:93).
Bride price also brings out women’s voices as part and parcel of their husband’s family. Some women testified that they cherished bride price because it made them to be seen as ‘real’ and ‘full’ women of the compound who have voices to speak among other women. Others explained that they helped their husbands to pay their bride price to give room for that of their girl children to be paid in the future. To this group of women, if your bride price is not paid, you are sidelined by other women of the compound and referred to as ‘half woman’. For women to be given out, to settle debt is an aspect of reducing human beings to chattels, meant to be sold, contrary to Art 1 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (United Nations General Assembly 1948), which enacts that every human being is born with dignity and rights, endowed with this right and should act towards one another with the spirit of brotherhood.
Findings equally suggest that bride price is the sole and most paramount pre-requisite for marriage in Bali Nyonga that overcomes other marriage requirements. Kiye (2015) asserts that it is only upon payment of bride price by the groom, that a bond can be established between families. Similarly, Cherishe and Cherishe (2010) also confirm that bride price validates marriage, reduces divorce rates and shows the commitment of men. Hamisu’s (2002) study in Cameroon concludes that without bride price, men will take it as a right to marry and divorce at will.
The suppression of legal laws by customary laws
According to findings of this study, customary law supersedes legal laws in Bali Nyonga. All the respondents interviewed confirmed that even if marriage is contracted in court and the couple wedded in church, that marriage can never be valid, except bride price is completely paid. A respondent confirmed that he wedded his wife and contracted his marriage in church, but upon the death of his wife, he was refused the mortal remains and threatened to lose his children. Another female respondent supported that she is married in court and in church, but the husband has not yet paid her bride price; her parent reminds her that her husband is not their in-law, and that if she would die, she can never be buried in his compound, if the man dies, she can never be his widow.
In the Cameroonian case of Maya Ikome vs Manga Ekemason supra, a man was refused next-of-kin of his deceased wife although they got married in church and court for 30 years. However, Kiye (2015:85) argues that prior to European colonisation of Cameroon, customary laws were applicable in indigenous courts throughout the territory under the supervision of traditional leaders. But with the advent of colonialism, extraneous European legal systems were imported into the territory, notably the French Civil Law and English Common Law. Kiye (2015) notes here that this has made Cameroon to operate on a bi-jural system where women are looked upon in court differently in these areas in terms of adjudication.
Coping strategies to redress bride price-related issues
Both men and women attested that although there is a Human Rights Commission and a Social Welfare in Bali Nyonga, any issue on bride price is solved within the family or village council of the fon’s palace [Nchubu Nted]. Similarly, Oni (2015:626) explains that in Nigeria, customary marriage can be dissolved without pronouncement or intervention of the court but must be done in the presence of the spouse’s parent or guardian, marriage middlemen and some elders.
According to the findings of this study, the women in Bali Nyonga have different approaches to overcome their problems stemming from the payment of bride price. All the women involved in levirate marriage (100%) abandoned and struggled to look for the money to pay and free themselves. Some women carry out petty trading, others worked on people’s farms and houses just to raise the money, while some objectified themselves as prostitutes. In another dimension, men also struggled to raise money to bury their wives in case of death when payment had not been effected. Some testified in an interview with Bali Nyonga women on 25 April 2023, that they borrowed money from Njangihouse [local money contribution houses, banks; others emptied their account and some sought assistance from friends and family members]. A few female participants (30%) advocate that women should raise money and support their husbands to pay the bride price when they are alive, rather than waiting for rituals and traditional rites to be performed on their mortal remains open demise. Pastoral care givers should use their influence while conducting premarital counselling to include this awareness in their premarital counselling package as a way to ensure that the new couples are being prepared so that they decide to also be critical on understanding some of these cultural traits (Baloyi 2015:490).
Conclusion
Bride price practices have evolved over the years in Bali Nyonga. It is evident that although marriage was mostly arranged by parents in the past, women and girls have the liberty to choose whom to marry today. However, no woman has ever negotiated bride price in Bali Nyonga and will hardly do so soon. Although colonialism introduced the Christian wedding culture, it did not have much influence on the culture of bride price in Bali Nyonga. Whether the couple marries in church or in court, if the bride price is not paid, that marriage is invalid and not recognised by the indigenes of Bali Nyonga. The payment of bride price therefore is the most valuable pre-requisite for marriage among other marriage requirements in Bali Nyonga, which must be paid completely, and it is refundable upon divorce. Thus, customary marriage supersedes statutory marriage and encompasses all other marriage requirements in the history of the Bali culture although with some variations. It is important to note that African traditional customs and values are not static, for there are gender constructs that can be deconstructed and reconstructed because change is constant. The fact that some families are noted for not receiving bride price in Bali Nyonga proves that payment of bride price is under deconstruction as earlier mentioned. Therefore, the erroneous assumption that African traditional customs, beliefs and values are monolithic and unchanging is only supported by some staunch relativists and traditional extremists who are full of patriarchal thoughts.
This research therefore recommends that women should form a synergy to fight against harmful practices resulting from the payment of bride price such as levirate marriage, refund of bride price and using them for settlement of debt. Woman should appeal through the village council to the heads of families to become part of bridal negotiation and engage in research on bride price because it directly concerns them. There is the need therefore for ‘her story’ and not just ‘history’. Men, on the other hand, should stop cohabitation and part payment to avoid payment of bride price on corpses because it traumatises and frustrates both men and women’s dignity as per the natural law of persons. Furthermore, the Bali Nyonga Village Council should ensure that the payment of the bride price is flexible and not made compulsory.
Acknowledgements
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no financial or personal relationships that may have inappropriately influenced them in writing this article.
Authors’ contributions
H.N.L-F. carried out conceptualisation, methodological plan, data gathering and first draft writing. N.V. carried out data gathering, investigations, first draft writing and sourcing. M.B.E. added more relevant sources, methodological considerations, co-writing, editing, consolidating all information, similarity check and sending document to journal.
Ethical considerations
Ethical clearance to conduct this study was obtained from the University of Buea’s Faculty of Social and Management Sciences Research Ethics Committee No. 2024/00007/UB/FSMS/WGS/HOD.
Funding information
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Data availability
The data that support the findings of this study are openly available from the corresponding author, M.B.E., upon reasonable request.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any affiliated agency of the authors.
References
African Union, 2003, Protocol to the African charter on human and people’s rights on the rights of women in Africa. African Union, Addis Ababa.
Anderson, S., 2007, ‘The economics of dowry and bride price’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(4), 151–174. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.21.4.151
Arnfred, S., 2004, Re-thinking sexuality in Africa, Almquist & Wiksell Trychei-AB, Sweden.
Ashraf, A., Bau, N., Nunn, N. & Voena, A., 2015, Bride price and female education, NBER/BREAD.
Asnell, N., 2001, ‘Because it’s our culture: (Re)negotiating the meaning of “Lobola” in South African Secondary Schools’, Journal of Southern African Studies 27(4), 697–716. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070120090691
Avenger, N.S., Yandev, M. & Arumun, S.A., 2013, ‘The effects of high bride price on marital stability’, Journal of Humanities and Social Science 17(5), 65–70. https://doi.org/10.9790/0837-1756570
Babaee, R. & Babaee, S., 2012, ‘Traditional versus modernity: A study on Emecheta’s “The bride price”’, Journal of African Studies and Development 4(6), 150–154. https://doi.org/10.5897/JASD12.020
Baloyi, M.E., 2010a, ‘Lobolo in the African communities’ ministries’, Journal of Theology and Religion in Africa 34(1), 50–70.
Baloyi, M.E., 2010b, ‘An African view of women as sexual objects as a concern for gender equality: A critical study’, Verbum et Ecclesia 31(1), 6, Art. #380. https://doi.org/10.4102/ve.v31i1.380
Baloyi, M.E., 2014, ‘Paying loboIa when my wife dies: an African pastoral study about the practice of forcing people to pay loboIa after their wives have passed away’, Journal af Human Ecology 48(1), 135–143.
Baloyi, M.E., 2015, ‘The Christian view of levirate marriage in a changing South Africa’, Journal of Sociology and Social Anthropology 6(4), 483–491. https://doi.org/10.31901/24566764.2015/06.04.05
Baloyi, M.E., 2016, ‘Sex as an expression of hospitality: Theological investigation amongst some Africans’, KOERS – Bulletin for Christian Scholarship 81(2). 10–17. https://doi.org/10.19108/koers.81.2.2248
Barend, T., 1975, Monks and magics: An analysis of religious ceremonies in Central Thailand, Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies, Monograph Series, 24, Studentlitteratur, Lund, Curzon Press, London.
Bedama, L. & Laishram, S., 2014, ‘Reflection of African marriage and culture bride price in Bunchi Emecheta’s The Bride Price’, The Criterion: An International Journal in English 5(3), 68–74.
Brain, R., 1967, The Bangwa of West Cameroon: A brief account of their history, University College London, London.
Broekhuizen, F. & Evans, A., 2014, ‘Pain, pleasure and bridal beauty: Mapping post-feminist bridal perfection’, Journal of Gender Studies 25(3), 335–348. https://doi.org/10.1080/09589236.2014.959478
Buchi, E., 1976, The bride price, Allisson and Busby, London.
Chabata, T., 2012, ‘The commercialization of “lobola” in contemporary Zimbabwe: A double edge sword for women’, BUWA! A Journal of African Women’s Experiences 2(1), 11–14.
Cherishe, E. & Cherishe, R., 2010, ‘The perceptions of Great Zimbabwe University students’, Journal of Pan African Studies 3(9), 1–11.
Chigwedere, A., 1982, Lobola, Books of Africa, Harare.
Chweshe, M.K., 2016, ‘Wives at the marketplace: Commercialization of “lobola” and commodification of women’s bodies in Zimbabwe’, The Oriental Anthropologist 16(2), 229–243. https://doi.org/10.1177/0976343020160202
Dlamini, C.R.M., 1991, ‘The role of customary law in meeting social needs’, Acta Juridica 3, 71–85.
Government of Cameroon, 2016, The Cameroon Penal Code, Law No. 2016/007, Sections 356(1) and 70(2), Official Gazette, Yaoundé.
Government of Cameroon, 1981a, The Cameroon Civil Status Registration Ordinance, Article 52(2), Official Gazette, Yaoundé.
Government of Cameroon, 1981b, Cameroon Civil Status Registration Ordinance, Sections 77(1)(2) and 70(1), Official Gazette, Yaoundé.
Government of the United Kingdom, 1955, The Southern Cameroon High Court Law, Article 27, Government Printer, Lagos.
Hamisu, D.R.I., 2002, ‘Customary bride price in Cameroon: Do women have a say?’, Southern African Feminist Research (SAFERE) 4–5(20), 65–71.
Kameri-Mbote, P., 2002, ‘Gender dimension of law, colonialism and inheritance in East Africa: Kenyan women experience’, International Environmental Law Research Centre 35(3), 373–398. https://doi.org/10.5771/0506-7286-2002-3-373
Kingah, P.K. & Kingah, S.S., 2010, ‘Africa traditions and the modern human rights mechanisms: The Case of Women in Cameroon and Africa’, Journal of Democracy and Human Rights of (CJDHR) 4(2).
Kiye, E.M., 2015, ‘Repugnancy and Incompatibility Tests, and Customary Law in Anglophones Cameroon’, Studies quarterly 1(15).
Leepalao, T., 2013, Among wedding procedures, Western & Southern Life, St. Paul Office.
Mawere, M. & Mawere, A.M., 2010, ‘Changing philososphy of African marriage: The relevance of the Shona customary marriage practice of Kukumbira’, Journal of African Studies and Development 2(9), 233–244.
Mbiti, J.S., 1990, African religions and philosophy, Heinemann, London.
Mbiti, J.S., 1991, Introduction to African Religion, 2nd edn., Heinemann Publishers, Blantyre.
Mester, A., 2008, ‘Sisters and Marriage in Shona Society’, Presented at EASA Conference Zimbabwe, Ljubljana Workshop W067, Brother and sisterhood in anthropological perspective, Session 1, 27th August.
Mikhail, S.L.B., 2002, Child marriage and child prostitution: Two forms of sexual exploitation, Oxfam Publications, Oxford.
Muthegheki, S.B., Crispus, K.S. & Abraham, N., 2012, An exploratory study on bride price and domestic violence in Bundibugyo District, Uganda, Centre for Human Rights Advancement, Portal Bundibugyo Road, Bundibugyo.
Ngassa, V., 1999, Gender approach to court action, Friedrich–Ebert Foundation, Yaoundé.
Nhlapo, T.R., 1991, ‘The African family and women’s rights: Friends or foes?’, Acta Juridica 3, 135–146.
Nkosi, S., 2011, Lobola: Black students’ perception of its role on gender dynamics, Research Report, Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
Nzoiwu, A., 2012, ‘A sculptural representation of traditional marriage (Ibya Nkwu) in the Ichida Town, Anambra State’, Mgbakoigba: Journal of African Studies 1, 1–14.
Oni, A.B., 2015, ‘Dissolutions of marriage contracted under customary law in Nigeria: Comments on Ezeaku vs Okwokwo’, US–China Law Review 12. https://doi.org/10.17265/1548-6605/2015.07.007
Onyango, E., 2016, ‘The negative consequences of dowry payment on women and society’, Pricilla Papers 30(1), 3.
Oxaal, Z. & Baden, S., 1997, Gender empowerment: Definitions, approaches and for policy, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.
Plateau, J.P. & Gaspart, F., 2005, The perverse effects of high bride price, Working Paper Centre Research in the Economic of Development (CRED), University of Namur.
Roger, N., 2004, ‘Human and economic costs of bride price in Uganda’, Makere University, Kampala.
United Nations General Assembly, 1948, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Palais de Chaillot, Paris.
United Nations General Assembly, 1966, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Article 77(2), United Nations General Assembly, New York, NY.
United Nations General Assembly, 2015, United Nations Sustainable Development Goals – Agenda 2030, Goal 4, United Nations General Assembly, New York, NY.
Walker, C.M., 1926, ‘Marriage, God and the Law: Revolution in marriage and the transformation of domestic authority in French Colonial Cameroon’, Minutes of the Meeting of 16 February 1926. Cameroon – Conscription of Yaoundé (AOM Agency Form 799, File 1855), Yaoundé.
Wegh, S.F., 2003, Between community change: Tiv concept of tradition and modernity, SNAAP Press Ltd, Enugu.
|
Hide
Show all
Email this article (Login required)
