A Southern African-centred account of mental disorder

Abstract

In this article, the author propose and argue for a Southern African-centred account of mental disorder that defines this mental condition in both evaluative and causal terms. It argues that mental illness must be understood through value judgements and primary causal factors. According to this account, for a condition to qualify as a mental disorder, it must meet three individually necessary and together sufficient criteria: (1) it must affect the mental state of an individual (beyond normal emotional responses), (2) it must be evaluated negatively by both an individual and the community and (3) there must be an identifiable non-physical cause(s).
Contribution: This article proposes a Southern African account of mental disorder, understood as a pathological condition, that differs from existing theories of disease, namely naturalism, normativism and hybridism in the philosophy of medicine. It draws on the cultural perspective of amafufunyana within the Southern African context and explores the implications of this account for consultation practice.